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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1996 Telecommunications Act ("1996 Act"), passed with
bipartisan support, aimed to overturn the existing regime of regulated
monopoly. Competition would be introduced, and regulation would fade
away. Rival networks would then provide the consumer protection long
delegated to state and federal agencies.
Elements of this strategy were cleanly implemented and have proven
effective. These include two important policies to assist new network
formation. The first was a federal preemption of state-issued franchise
monopolies in local telecommunications. Most states had permitted but one
operator, per area, to offer local phone service. In addition to other
advantages, this measure instantly allowed 11,000 locally franchised cable
TV operators to compete in a head-to-head rivalry with local exchange
carriers ("LECs"). A second competitive strategy was an interconnection
mandate, meaning that new networks would be able to exchange traffic
with existing networks, thus facilitating entry. These rules enabled the
emergence of hundreds of competitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs")
in the aftermath of the 1996 Act.
1
The third strategy, however, has proven more problematic and will be
the focus of this Essay. To assist the emergence of competition, the 1996
Act decreed that firms were to be given the opportunity to serve local
phone customers without building physical network infrastructure, sharing
the facilities owned by incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs"). If
negotiations over wholesale rates proved unsuccessful, regulation would
provide a solution. Competitive entrants would be offered each unbundled
piece of existing phone networks (e.g., local loops and switching) at prices
set by the government. Regulated wholesale access would be a stepping
stone for new networks, which would then have the economic ability and
incentive to construct new facilities of their own.
The object of this approach was not retail competition on the reseller
model, which-with wholesale price controls-transferred fundamental
economic planning from capital markets to governments. Rather, the aim
was to create new physical networks by incentivizing infrastructure build-
1. See generally Thomas W. Hazlett, Economic and Political Consequences of the
1996 Telecommunications Act, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1359 (1999) (detailing the economic
consequences of the 1996 Act and the impact upon CLECs and cable companies); ROBERT
W. CRANDALL & THOMAS W. HAZLETT, Telecommunications Policy Reform in the United
States and Canada, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIBERALIZATION ON TWO SIDES OF THE
ATLANTIC 8-38 (Martin Cave & Robert W. Crandall, eds., 2001) (discussing the increased
competition from CLECs after the 1996 Act).
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out. The 1996 Act was clear on this point, as federal courts have held, yet it
downloaded sufficient transition management responsibility to the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") and state public utility
commissions for the policy to become conflicted. Regulators found their
authority over price controls a tempting source of rent redistribution.
Wholesale access terms were imposed to create retail competition by
disrupting the crucial signals sent by retail customers to capital markets.
The long-term adjustments prompted by nominal price reductions were
largely external to the calculus of decisionmakers in this process, a
nonmarket failure.
The central contradictions of the regime were manifested in the costs
and benefits flowing from favorable resale terms offered CLECs to use the
networks owned by ILECs. Terms making resale entry attractive
simultaneously undercut incentives for entrants and incumbents to invest in
fixed infrastructure. There is a theoretical argument that, while wholesale
price regulation may induce some disinvestment in local telephone
networks, this effect can be fully offset by strong economies of scope
between retail service and infrastructure ownership. Given a quick and
economical way to market services using the incumbent's network, the
entrant is advantaged in ultimately creating its own. This prospect will, in
turn, push incumbent network owners to invest in upgrades, as well. But
this policy needle is difficult to thread.
Gerald Faulhaber has reviewed the historical experience of "policy-
induced competition" in telecommunications. 3 In some episodes, such as
the opening of the phone equipment market, the mandate of a modular
access point--typified by the now familiar telephone jack-worked to
promote competition. The key was that the regulated border between the
incumbent's network and the new rivals' interconnection was simple to
define. It was a natural border.
In more complicated interfaces, however, results have been
disappointing. Faulhaber classifies the post-1996 Act unbundling rules as
intensely complex, artificial, and not likely to succeed. Richard Epstein
sees economic incentives as exacerbating the informational requirements
stressed by Faulhaber.4 The incentives for cooperation achieved in
contracts are absent when regulators imposed forced marriage on ILECs
2. See Thomas W. Hazlett & Arthur M. Havenner, The Arbitrage Mirage: Regulated
Access Prices with Free Entry in Local Telecommunications Markets, 2 REV. OF NETWORK
ECON. 440,441 (2003).
3. See generally Gerald R. Faulhaber, Policy-Induced Competition: The
Telecommunications Experiments, 15 INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 73 (2003).
4. Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Commons, and Associations: Why the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 Misfired, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 315, 315 (2005).
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and CLECs.
Alfred Kahn sees political actors engaging in the rent seeking game
that ensues. 5 By creating mechanisms to redistribute income within the
industry, political coalitions form to claim the rents at stake. Firms are
rewarded for political support when rules are adjusted in their favor, and
firms targeted for potential appropriation find it profit maximizing to
increase their political investments for defensive purposes. This results in
higher returns to those who influence the regulatory process.
6
The evidence from telecommunications markets supports the view
that mandatory network sharing has effectively blocked the transition it
was advanced to assist. Conversely, the transition to competitive networks
anticipated in the 1996 Act has been largely achieved, albeit through the
development of alternative telecommunications systems not aided by
mandatory network sharing rules. Competition has proceeded outside in,
not inside out. The emergence of what Faulhaber calls "category killers" is
now facilitating a transition to competition in local telephony.
These marketplace alternatives have been delayed by distractions and
impediments erected under policy-induced competition. Hence, the legal
collapse of that regime is welcome in the marketplace. Of key significance
is the March 2, 2004, opinion rendered in the case of United States
Telephone Association v. Federal Communications Commission (USTA
I/),7 which-with the June 9, 2004, decision of the FCC not to appeal that
5. ALFRED KAHN, LETrING Go: DEREGULATING THE PROCESS OF DEREGULATION OR
TEMPTATION OF THE KLEPTOCRATS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATORY
DISINGENUOUSNESS (1998); ALFRED E. KAHN, LESSONS FROM DEREGULATION:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND AIRLINES AFTER THE CRUNCH (2004). See also Alfred E. Kahn,
Timothy J. Tardiff & Dennis L. Weisman, The Telecommunications Act at Three Years: An
Economic Evaluation of Its Implementation by the Federal Communications Commission, 7
INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 319 (1999).
6. See FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION,
AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997).
7. The ruling making sequence is as follows: Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499 (1996), rev'd
in part, affd in part, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), rev'd in part, affid in part, 525 U.S. 366
(1999); Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
15 F.C.C.R. 3696 (1999); Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Supplemental Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 1760 (1999);
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Fourth Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-98, 14 F.C.C.R. 20912 (1999); Iowa
Util. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744 (8th Cit. 2000); Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Supplemental Order Clarification, 15
F.C.C.R. 9587 (2000), affd sub nom., 309 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Implementation of the
Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 22781 (2001); Verizon Comm., Inc., v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002);
U.S. Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC (USTA 1), 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002); U.S. Telecomm.
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opinion to the U.S. Supreme Court 8--overturned essentially the entire
regime for unbundled network elements ("UNEs").
This Essay reviews evidence yielded by a series of natural
experiments that permit evaluation of comparative institutional
mechanisms for encouraging telecommunications competition. First, the
pattern of entry by CLECs is examined. These data suggest that resale
competition achieved via unbundling regulation does not lead to additional
facilities-based entry, but tends to displace such activity. Deployment of
cable telephony, for instance, slowed just as unbundled network elements-
platform ("UNE-P") line growth accelerated, and then accelerated with the
collapse of the UNE-P regime. Second, according to the stepping stone
theory, capital expenditures by networks are predicted to rise with
unbundling. In fact, investment flows fall dramatically in the sector for
both incumbents and entrants as network sharing increases. This pattern
cannot be explained solely by the business cycle, as it is distinct from that
observed in adjacent markets where different sharing rules apply.
Third, alternative policy regimes suggest that competition is viable in
the absence of mandatory network sharing. In residential broadband, the
least regulated medium, cable modem service, has consistently
outperformed its direct rival---digital subscriber line ("DSL") service-
provided via local exchange carrier networks. When DSL service was
partly deregulated in early 2003, however, the broadband race markedly
intensified. DSL penetration increased in absolute terms and relative to
cable growth, an outcome inconsistent with the view that network-sharing
mandates promote investment or deployment.
In wireless phone markets, competitive entry proved highly effective
once personal communications service ("PCS") operators were licensed,
beginning in 1995. Nominal retail prices fell approximately 79% in the
1993-2002 period (from $0.57 per minute to $0.12) 9with minutes of use
rising 3158% (from 19 billion minutes to 619 billion). State rate regulation
Ass'n v. FCC (USTA 11), 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
8. Ben Charny, Bush Administration Won't Appeal Phone Decision, CNET
NEWS.COM, June 9, 2004, http://news.com.com/Bush+administratio+won't+appeal+phone+
decision/2100-1037_3-5229698.html.
9. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Fourth Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-98, 14
F.C.C.R. 20912 (1999); Iowa Util. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2000);
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Supplemental Order Clarification, 15 F.C.C.R. 9587 (2000), affd sub nom., 309 F.3d
8 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 22781
(2001); Verizon Comm., Inc., v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002); U.S. Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC
(USTA 1), 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002); U.S. Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC (USTA I1), 359
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was preempted in August 1994, allowing comparison between competing
regimes. Cellular rates did not exhibit a post-deregulation "fly-up,"
showing that the rate control scheme-which included wholesale prices to
facilitate reseller competition in retail markets-was ineffective. When
PCS entry occurred, however, rates fell dramatically, both absolutely and
relative to trend, providing further evidence of the effectiveness of
facilities-based competition. The emergence of competitive wireless
networks also reveals how market institutions naturally arise, as the resale
model, having proven difficult to effectively implement via regulation in
fixed or wireless networks, now flourishes in mobile phone markets with
such national "carriers" as TracFone or Virgin Mobile.
Of direct significance for local telephone regulation is that competing
facilities are in place. Cable TV systems pass about ninety-nine percent of10...
U.S. households and can economically supply either circuit-switched or
Voice over Internet Protocol ("Vol") telephony."I In addition to this head-
to-head fixed line rivalry, plain old telephone service ("POTS") faces
competition from at least four national wireless networks. 12 Substantial
migration has already taken place, with wireline long distance calls sharply
declining as wireless carriers offer subscribers "buckets" of domestic
anywhere minutes.
Since June 2004, the emergence of facilities-based competition has
intensified. Cable operators and ILECs have stepped up "triple play"
offerings of voice, video, and high-speed data; phone carriers have invested
more aggressively in fiber to the home allowing delivery (without direct
broadcast satellite ("DBS") of the triple play menu; cable operators, now
embracing VoIP, serve about 5,000,000 telephone customers, while
independent VolP supplier Vonage has over 1.3 subscribers.
13
F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Ben Charny, Bush Administration Won't Appeal Phone Decision,
CNET NEWS.COM, June 9, 2004, http://news.comBush+adninistration+won't+appeal+
phone+decision/2100-1037_3-5229698.html. See CELLULAR TELECOMM. & INTERNET
ASs'N, SEMIANNUAL DATA SURVEY RESULTS (2005), http://files.ctia.orgpdf/CTIAEndYear
2005Survey.pdf.
10. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n, Industry Overview, http://www.ncta.com/
Docs/PageContent.cfm?pagelD=-86 (last visited Apr. 7, 2006). Statistic is reported as an
estimate for 2006.
11. Cox Communications, Whitepaper: Voice over Internet Protocol: Ready for Prime
Time 2 (May 2004), http://media.corporate-ir.netlmediaL.files/TROl17676341/May_
whitepaper_2.pdf. Cox, the cable company that has most aggressively deployed telephony,
estimates that per phone subscriber capital costs for VoIP have fallen to under $300,
compared to just over $500 for traditional circuit-switched voice service. Id. at 11.
12. The four national networks consist of Cingular (having acquired AT&T Wireless),
Verizon Wireless, Sprint (having acquired Nextel), and T-Mobile.
13. Peter Grant, Cable-TV Companies Hold Great Expectations, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25,
2006, at C1.
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These developments suggest that recent deregulatory changes are pro-
consumer. But they also support the view that policy makers can do much
more to assist the creation of competitive options both by continuing to
trim the regulatory obligations of network owners and by increasing the
availability of radio spectrum. As shown below, the artificial scarcity
imposed by federal regulators in wireless markets is now the overwhelming
obstacle to both enhanced competition and telecommunications network
development.
H. NETWORK SHARING RULES PURSUANT TO THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT
The vision of the 1996 Act was that the traditional model of regulated
monopoly was obsolete and that public policy should switch strategies to
accommodate the advent of competitive networks. The 1996 Act thus
terminated a long march. Where the 1950s had seen an end-to-end
telephone monopoly oppose use of any foreign equipment, including the14
Hush-a-Phone attachment (a rubber cup that, fastened onto a handset,
allowed a caller to speak without being heard in the next cubicle),
micromanaged markets ultimately proved deficient. Joe Farrell, the FCC's
chief economist in 1996, explained:
[Tielephone regulation, like the tax code, has grown unwieldy,
unmanageable, inefficient, and dysfunctional. It's time to find an
alternative. Competition is the greatest technique ever invented to
bring about innovation, low prices, choice, and efficiency. If we can
efficiently create competition in this so-called natural monopoly, we'll
have done a great thing.' 5
As the passage notes, the policy strategy was not to simply convert
assumptions, but to actively create competitive rivalry in the last mile. This
is where end users connect to phone networks. To help new service
providers get going, network sharing rules were imposed. Entrants could
piggy-back on incumbents' connections, reselling service. This could be
done either in a total service resale ("TSR") package, with the competitor
retailing phone service delivered entirely over the incumbent's network, or
the entrant could use just part of the existing network, unbundling ILEC
facilities such as the local loop. Mandatory network sharing would be a
stepping stone that would assist rivals building new networks.
Sharing rules would be rendered moot, however, if prices, or other
terms of use, were set so as to discourage entry. Hence, rate regulation was
established for wholesale network access. TSR prices were based on the
14. Joseph Farrell, Creating Local Competition, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 201, 206 (1996),
available at http:llwww.law.indiana.edu/fclj/pubs/v49/nol/farrell.html.
15. Id. at 202.
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regulated retail price of service minus the avoided costs of the incumbent
carrier-cost savings from having another firm provide marketing and
customer service-generally yielding entrants discounts from retail prices
of 15-25%.16
The pricing of UNEs involved more complex rules, pursuant to FCC
decisions in the aftermath of the 1996 Act. First, regulators decided which
pieces of the network were to be offered separately. Then regulators set
prices for each UNE. The framework adopted by the FCC used the
theoretical costs of an ideally efficient new network, a model known as
total element long-run incremental cost ('TELRIC").17 Because existing
networks are built with older technology and may not be optimally
configured given changing demand and supply conditions, wholesale prices
are set below an incumbent's actual costs under TELRIC rates. 
18
The original idea of unbundling was that the entrant would want to
purchase elements of the incumbent's network to combine with other
elements it would provide, overcoming barriers to entry. The FCC,
however, ended up creating a package that offered all unbundled network
elements in a program called unbundled network elements-platform
("UNE-P"). Alfred Kahn notes the contradiction in terms, which references
reassembly of the parts regulators disassembled in order to assist
competitive entry. 19 The policy was important, however, because it
typically offered prices far below TSR. Analysts estimated that the average
discount for wholesale access under UNE-P (from retail prices) reached
about fifty percent in 2003.20
The decision by the government to offer relatively low prices for
16. UBS WARBURG, How MUCH PAIN FROM UNE-P? 6 (2002), http://files.cwa-
union.org/National/CommunicationsPolicy/Other/ubsanalysis.pdf.
17. Alfred Kahn underscores the key point in his colorful depiction of the rule as
"TELRIC-BS." The appended acronym is said to stand for "blank slate," which captures
perhaps the key pricing element: costs are determined by regulators to be what a most
efficient network would incur if built today. Since prices are periodically reset and costs,
driven by technological advance, tend to fall over time in telecommunications networks, this
means that network owners will predictably recoup less than the costs they incur when the
facilities they create are rented in future periods. KAHN (1998), supra note 5. See also Robert
Pindyck, Mandatory Unbundling and Irreversible Investment in Telecom Networks (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10287, 2004), available at
http://papers.nber.org/papers.w10287.pdf.
18. "[I]t appears to have been common ground that, because of ongoing technological
improvement (among other things), prices so determined would fall well below the costs the
ILECs had actually historically incurred in constructing the elements." USTA 11, 359 F.3d at
562.
19. KAHN (2004), supra note 5, at 23.
20. The Far-Reaching Impact of UNE-P Regulation, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE 5
(Oct. 2003) (on file with Author).
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wholesale access was based on the belief that competitive entry would be
encouraged. 2 1 Low wholesale prices can do that, but they simultaneously
discourage other entry, as well as discourage capacity expansion or quality
upgrades by incumbents. Marketplace results will be reviewed below. One
clear outcome is that the rule-setting process has proven extremely
quarrelsome, with substantial public and private resources diverted from
productive enterprise. Said one analyst: "You have a total Hatfield and
McCoy feud. This is an eight-year, claw-your-opponent's-eye-out battle
regulatorily, legally and politically. If they could have settled this, they
would have, a long time ago."
' 22
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia overturned,
for the third time, the FCC's unbundling rules in March 2004.2 3 When the
Bush Administration and the FCC decided not to appeal this ruling to the
U.S. Supreme Court in June 2004, a new policy was at hand. Quickly, both
leading CLECs-AT&T and MCI-made plans to suspend their resale
offerings.
24
But the retreat from regulation did not spell the end of competition or
even an unambiguous economic victory for the Bell Companies, the owners
of the leading ILEC networks. As CLECs abandoned UNE-P they
simultaneously embraced emerging networks. According to one trade
publication: "AT&T Corp., the most visible of the UNE-P resellers, has
been ... signaling its strategy by pulling out of numerous markets, rolling
out VoIP and striking wholesale deals with competitive LECs ....
AT&T[']s migration to competitive facilities is mirrored by other UNE-P
providers."
25
Covad, a data services provider that rents incumbents' local loops to
deliver DSL service, joined the Intel-led WiMax Coalition developing
wireless broadband networks. "WiMAX lets providers bypass phone
21. The argument has been made that it is efficient to mandate prices that allow
incumbent network owners to recover only their marginal costs or such costs plus some
allowance for common costs without reference to the sunk costs of creating the network
infrastructure. This confuses the profit maximizing behavior of a firm over short-term
intervals with the conditions necessary to stimulate the optimal level of investment over
time. See Pindyck, supra note 17, at 9, 11-12 (quotation marks omitted).
22. Ellen Simon, Phone Competition Dials up a Battle Royal, WASH. POST, May 21,
2004, available at http://www.freepress.net/news/print.php?id=3609 (citation omitted).
23. See USTA II, 359 F.3d at 554.
24. See Almar Latour & Shawn Young, Rules Change Could Alter the Fate of Long-
Distance Giants, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2004, at B1, B3.
25. Khali Henderson, UNE-P Resellers: It's Your Move, PHONE+, Aug. 2004,
http://www.phoneplusmag.comarticles/481resell0l.html. AT&T claimed the move was "a
major step moving away from dependence on the Bells' UNE-P to facilities-based
competition." Susan Polyakova, AT&T To Move to UNE-L if Regulatory Clarity is Ensured,
COMM. DAILY, July 8, 2004, at 1 (citation omitted).
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companies for the 'last mile' connections to homes and businesses."' 26 The
transition to wireless is reported thusly:
Covad has relied on traditional copper lines leased from the Bells for
its DSL service, using access that has been mandated for years.... But
the Federal Communications Commission is phasing in regulations that
will not require the Bells to share new lines with outside companies.
Fearing that the Bells will charge exorbitant rates or refuse to share
lines altogether, Covad and other companies that resell Internet access
are looking for alternative technologies for their wholesale broadband.
EarthLink has already made initial forays into the wireless market,
recently launching a service with Digitalpath in Northern California.
27
The EarthLink venture has since expanded via a new partnership with
Korea's SK Telecom. Using network capacity of Verizon Wireless and
Sprint PCS, EarthLink now offers high-speed (i.e., Code-Division Multiple
Access ("CDMA") Evolution-Data Optimized ("EV-DO") wireless
services, targeting early adopters of advanced applications. The foray,
branded as Helio, is premised on unregulated wholesale access to CDMA
networks using the MVNO model.
28
The consensus emerged that, despite the decline of UNE-P, "wireless
and VolP services, including over cable, will likely provide increasing
competition."2 9 Revealingly, the lapse of unbundling obligations was not. . . .. 30
met with visible investor enthusiasm for Bell company shares. This was
no surprise to analysts who have largely touted the theme: "Bell Legal
Victory: Winning the Battle, but Losing the War." 31 They conclude that the
26. Bill Wolfe, New Long-Range Standard May Heat Up Wireless Internet, THE
CouRIER-J., Feb. 22, 2004, at El.
27. Jim Hu, Cable, DSL face threats, CNET NEws.coM, July 29, 2004,
http://news.com.comBroadband+Cable%2C+DSL+face+threats/2009-1034_3-5261385.
html.
28. Matthew Maier, Sky Dayton Goes Cellular, BusINEss 2.0, Feb. 1, 2005,
http://www.helio.com/headlines/sk-020105.pdf. CDMA is the code division multiple access
algorithm used to deliver advanced voice and data services, and is the basic technology used
in the U.S. by Verizon Wireless and Sprint. MVNOs are mobile virtual network operators
that provide retail wireless service by purchasing minutes in bulk from owners of physical
networks.
29. Legg Mason, Bells on Roll, but FCC Fights Affect Speed, Scope of Wholesale/UNE
Relief, MEMORANDUM, June 30, 2004, at 1 (on file with the Author).
30. Between June 9 when the Administration announced it would not appeal the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals opinion to the U.S. Supreme Court, and June 15 when the UNE
rules were allowed to lapse (the U.S. Supreme Court turned down a stay the preceding day)
the legal battle to save the existing UNE rules was lost. Share prices of the three large-cap
Bell Operating Companies-BellSouth, SBC, and Verizon-from the opening on June 1 to
close on June 21, a period framing the regulatory period, reveals virtually no movement
relative to the S&P 500 Index. Equally weighted returns, relative to the market, were 0.13%
for the three companies over the three week period.
31. PRECURSOR GRP., BELL LEGAL VICTORY: WINNING THE BATLE, BUT LOSING THE
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incumbents' legacy networks are better off with fewer unbundling
obligations, but that the regulatory relief is "too little, too late, and
technology has replaced regulation as the main driver of the competitive
threat to the Bells."
'32
III. TESTING THE "STEPPING STONE" THEORY
A. Growth in CLEC Lines
In commenting on the Supreme Court's May 2002 decision33 to
uphold the use of TELRIC in pricing wholesale access, Greg Rosston and
Roger Noll wrote:
[T]he decision permits a test of whether the stepping stone theory of
local access entry is valid. While the outcome of this experiment is
uncertain, two possible outcomes are likely to be good for consumers.
One is that facilities-based competition in wire-line access, with
entrants eventually providing switching and other intelligent network
functions, emerges from UNE-based entrants. The second is that
wireless services make local telephone access competitive even if
wire-line competition remains very limited. In either case, local access
regulation can be replaced by competition.
The third possible outcome is that when the dust settles, most local
access competition will take the form [of] resale of the incumbent's
facilities. In this case, consumers are not likely to benefit, and
regulation will, if anything, grow as regulators 3 re called upon to
resolve disputes between incumbents and resellers.
The results of this empirical test are now available. The pattern
exhibited by the growth of CLEC lines is seen in Figure 1.35 UNE-P lines
were numerically insignificant until 1999. At that point, UNE-P lines were
dominated by TSR and CLEC-owned lines. With regulatory changes
associated with the 271 certification process, 3 6 the growth in such lines was
WAR, PRECURSOR TELECOM & MEDIA RESEARCH (June 18, 2004) (on file with the Author).
32. Id.
33. Verizon Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002).
34. Gregory L. Rosston & Roger G. Noll, The Economics of the Supreme Court's
Decision on Forward Looking Costs, 1 REV. OF NETWORK ECON. 81, 88-89 (2002).
35. See IND. ANALYSIS & TECH. Div., FCC, LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION: STATUS
AS OF JUNE 30, 2004 1 (2004), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/
Reports/FCC-State Link/ILAD/lcom0604.pdf.
36. In the 1996 Act, Bell companies were permitted to offer long-distance service in
their local service territories once they satisfied regulators that their local markets were open
to competition. Political compromises were eventually reached that included substantially
more favorable terms and conditions for UNE access, resulting in the rapid increase in the
use of such lines by CLECs. The first Section 271 certification granted was to Verizon's
petition in New York in December 1999, the second was to SBC's petition in Texas in June
2000. The process was completed for all other states in 2004.
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rapid. As this growth accelerated, growth in facilities-based, or CLEC-
owned, lines does not follow, but appears to slow. By 2004, there were
about 29 million CLEC lines compared to about 152 million ILEC
lines,37of which:
Fig. 1. CLEC Lines byType
--- CLEC Owned (total)
-4- CLEC Owned (non-cable)
. NE- P .)I ' --- Resold Lines
-- UNE-P + Resale
-e.-CLEC Owned (cable)
. 16 million were UNE-P
.2 million were TSR
.7 million were provided over competitive networks, including about
three million cable telephone lines
.4 million used ILEC local loops but otherwise used the facilities (e.g.,
switches and transport) of the CLEC, an approach called "UNE-
L.,
38
Hence, UNE-P lines quickly came to dominate CLEC lines.
Moreover, as UNE-P lines increased, growth in facilities-based entry did
not accelerate, but flattened. As UNE-P lines grew over 300% in the 2000
to mid-2003 period, facilities-based competitive lines grew just twenty
percent-a substantial slowing of the trend. The number of facilities-based,
noncable lines decreased from 4.1 million at the end of 2000 to 3.2 million
by mid-2003. The correlation between UNE-P lines and non cable
facilities-based lines is almost a perfect -1 (-.99685), meaning that UNE-P
line growth has been accompanied by a simultaneous reduction in
facilities-based competitive lines period by period.
In econometric tests, the level of UNE-P subscribership in one period
does not help predict the level of facilities-based competitive
subscribership in the next period. Rather than provide a stepping stone to
new entry, the UNE-P regulatory offering appears to crowd out new
37. IND. ANALYSIS & TECH. Dw., FCC, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
RELEASES DATA ON LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION 1 (2004).
38. Patrick Brogan & Scott Cleland, Facilities-Based CLECs Benefit from Migration
Away from UNE-P, PRECURSOR BULLETIN, July 7, 2004 (on file with the Author).
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networks. The proportion of UNEs accounted for by UNE-P increases from
about one-third in 1999 to about four-fifths in 2004.
B. Cable Telephony: The Dog That Didn't Bark
Were the 1996 Act to encourage development of competitive phone
networks, the entry path provided by cable TV system expansion would
appear to be the obvious place to begin. National cable TV infrastructure
was in place prior to the 1996 Act, and the costs for upgrading that
infrastructure to provide voice telephony comparable to that provided by
LECs was modest. As calculated by Cox Cable, the incremental cost of an
average phone subscriber was about $527 in 2003and featured a payback
period of just three years based on conservative demand assumptions.
Indeed, cable operators aggressively expanded their service menus to
include high-speed Internet access in the late 1990s and quickly became the
dominant providers of broadband access in residential markets, passing
over 107 million households (of about 110 million households) and
garnering over 24 million subscribers as of December 2005.40 Yet, cable
phone service has lagged far behind. Despite serving more than 2 million
subscribers in 2001, cable telephony growth slowed to a crawl in 2002-
2003. (See Figure 2.) Not only did cable operators decide not to pursue
telephone subscribers as aggressively as they sought broadband customers,
they actively chose to pull back from this market.
Renewed cable industry enthusiasm for phone service, however, was
evident in 2004. As the network sharing regulation regime collapsed,
several cable companies-often in partnership with CLECs-announced
that they were deploying new VolP offerings. By year-end 2004, VolP
subscribership reached 1 million, up from 130,000 at year-end 2003, half of
which was attributed to cable TV operators.42 In 2005, cable telephone
households increased by 1,928,400-well over ten times 2003's growth of
156,000.4 3 Cable telephone service is increasingly available to customers,
39. Whitepaper, supra note 11, at 11.
40. LEICHTMAN RESEARCH GRP., RESEARCH NoTEs 8 (1Q 2006), http://www.leitchtman
research.com/research/notes03_2006.pdf [hereinafter LEICHTMAN 2006].
41. The industry leaders in phone service had been AT&T and Cox. When Comcast
acquired AT&T's cable assets in 2002, it announced that it was suspending marketing
efforts aimed at new subscribers, leaving Cox virtually alone in pursuit of cable phone
customers.
42. As of year-end 2004, Yankee Group estimated that 1 million Americans subscribed
to VoIP service, of which 500,000 subscribed to VoIP delivered by their cable operator.
ZDNet, IT Facts, 1 Mln U.S. VoIP Subscribers by Year-End 2004, http://www.itfacts.biz/
index.php?id=P1453 (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
43. LEICHTMAN RESEARCH GRP. supra note 41, at 7; LEIcHTMAN RESEARCH GRP.,
RESEARCH NOTEs 8 (1 Q 2004) (on file with the Author) [hereinafter LEICHTMAN 2004].
Number 31
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
and the existence of a wireline substitute drives improvements in the price
and quality of LEC-supplied voice service. Cable TV systems offered just
16% of U.S. households phone service at year-end 2003, but this increased
to one-half of U.S. households by year-end 2005.
44
Fig. 2. Cable Telephone Subscribers
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Source: IND. ANALYSIS & TECH. Div., FCC, LOCAL TELEPHONE
COMPETITION: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30,2004 1 (2004).
The demise of the network sharing regime was coincident with the
emergence of VoIP, which was long anticipated as a substitute for POTS.
45
With UNE-P resale expanding, cable networks reduced their own exposure
to rent appropriation by delaying investment in telephony. This
economized on certain irreversible investments, eliminating risks
associated with competing in a market where rivals' input costs may be
adjusted up or down according to political decisions. In April 2004, a
broadband industry analyst saw the conundrum thusly:
The crux of the problem for cable is this. Thanks to UNE-P regulations
and the entrance of U.S. long distance companies into local telephony,
lifeline plain old telephone service (POTS) is already a commodity....
AT&T, Sprint, and MCI are now all selling their own unlimited local
and long-distance consumer POTS service bundles for under $50 a
month (taxes excluded). These plans, like AT&T One Rate USA, The
Neighborhood by MCI and Sprint Complete Sense, often include
value-added features like voicemail, caller ID, call waiting and three-
way calling. For the low end of the market, they offer even simpler
bundles for under $30 per month. One has to wonder: Why would most
44. LEICHTMAN 2004, supra note 43; LEICHTMAN 2006, supra note 41.
45. See, e.g., Eric J. Savitz, 'Net Threat: Internet Telephony Promises to Send Some
Conventional Phone Businesses Packing, BARRON'S, Oct. 13, 1997, at 37.
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mainstream consumers risk going to cable IP phone service when they
can switch to AT&T for a package that is cost-comparable[?] 46
But just as this question was being posed, the UNE-P regime collapsed.
The virtually instantaneous combustion of VoIP, strongly aided by cable
TV operators, suggests that the network sharing mandates exerted a
strongly negative effect on telecommunications investment incentives. This
expectation was explicitly voiced by market analysts.
47
IV. INVESTMENT AND NETWORK SHARING IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETS
A. Wireline Telecommunications Investment
Investment in local telecommunications networks declined
precipitously in the period coincident with the implementation of extensive
network sharing, as measured by the increase in UNE-P lines. The
incidence and effects of this investment decline were widely noted by
analysts.4 8 The key policy issue is whether the entire decline can be
attributed to cyclical factors specific not to telecommunications regulation
but to the post-bubble stock market crash. Investment patterns reveal that,
while capital spending generally deteriorated throughout the sector,
declines were notably severe among CLECs and ILECs. This relatively
poor performance occurred as network sharing mandates facilitated
competitive entry via resale, the ostensible trigger for additional
investments by incumbents and entrants alike under the stepping stone
theory.
46. Michael Harris, Cable's IP Telephony Conundrum, CABLE DATACOM NEWS, Apr. 1,
2004, www.cabledatacomnews.com/apr04/apr04-2.html.
47. FULCRUM GLOBAL PARTNERS WIRELINE COMMUNICATIONS: REVISING BLS AND SBC
ESTIMATES DUE TO AWE DILUTION 2 (Mar. 10, 2004).
We believe UNE-P demise could accelerate broadband deployment-with the
potential elimination of UNE-P resale, we believe the spread of broadband could
accelerate, as companies would not be as concerned with the loss of telephony
subscribers to such companies that do not have to invest in ANY infrastructure.
Simply put, where UNE-P is successful, cable telephony has not been. Such a
move to eliminate UNE-P would further the FCC's primary objective of near
ubiquitous nationwide broadband deployment, in our opinion.
Id. (emphasis in original) (on file with the Author).
48. See, e.g., SOUNDVIEw TECH. GRP, WIRELINE COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES: SECTOR
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE UPDATE (May 1, 2003) (on file with the Author); J. Parmelee,
Telecom Equipment-Wireline Update, CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON, Sept. 26, 2002 (on
file with the Author); FULCRUM GLOBAL PARTNERS, WIRELINE COMMUNICATIONS:
THOUGHTS ON FCC ORDER (Feb. 25, 2003) (on file with the Author); PRECURSOR GRP.,
WIRELINE TELECOM CAPEX GUIDANCE Is LIKELY Too OPTIMISTIC (Aug. 8, 2003) (on file
with the Author).
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The flow of capital investment by local telecommunications entrants
reached a high in 2000, then declined 85% by 2003. 49 (See Figure 3.) This
effectively means that the entire value of capital investment undertaken
through 2002-at least $72 billion-was eliminated, as the market value of
the entire CLEC sector was only about $4 billion in 2003, or approximately
the level of 2003 capital investment.50 This level of disinvestment is
inconsistent with the stepping stone theory, and additionally suggests that
the business model of resale at regulated wholesale rates proved financially
unsustainable.
5 1
Fig. 3. CLEC Capital Expenditures
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While CLEC investment was effectively disappearing, ILEC
investment was rapidly declining. (See Figure 4.) While the postbubble
direction is, as in other communications sector segments, downward, LLEC
investment in 2003 was substantially below the 1996 level in nominal
dollars. Capital expenditures by Regional Bell Operating Companies
("RBOCs"), about $22 billion in 1996, fell to about $17 billion in 2003;
adjusting by the Consumer Price Index, this constitutes a real decline of
approximately 34%.
49. The data in this subsection are taken from the ALTS Annual Report (2004) (on file
with the Author) unless otherwise noted.
50. Id. at 18 (on file with the Author).
51. See Hazlett & Havenner, supra note 2.
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Fig. 4. RBOC Cap Ex, 1990-2003
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The fall in RBOC spending, then, does not appear to constitute simply
a post-bubble adjustment. By 2003, the annual investment flow had fallen
to just 13.5% of revenues. (See Figure 5, infra.) This appears to indicate
network disinvestment, as industry analysts believe that a level of capital
expenditure between 15-20% is necessary to simply maintain the capital
stock. Morgan Stanley cites the experience of Ameritech, which reduced its
capital expenditure to sales ratio to 13.7% in 1994 and 1995. "Service
quality complaints filed with state regulatory authorities ramped
significantly from 15 per 1 million access lines in 1994 to 1,044 per million
in 2000 by the time the [acquisition by SBC] was closed."52
Figure 5. Cap Ex as Percent of Revenues
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2004), slide 11.
Group, in ALTS Annual Report (July
52. MORGAN STANLEY, WIRELINE TELECOM SERVICES TREND TRACKER: NOWHERE TO
HIDE 52 (Mar. 3, 2003) (on file with the Author) [hereinafter TREND TRACKER].
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B. Telecommunications Regulation and the Investment Decline
Financial analysts have repeatedly found that one important factor
making telecommunications investments uneconomic, for both incumbent
and competing carriers, is the overhang produced by network sharing
mandates. The prospect that UNE-P line growth will ramp up, spurred by
low, regulated wholesale terms, offers a disincentive to the creation of the
substitute product-irreversible capital infrastructure.
A consensus of industry and financial analysts formed around the view
that the U.S. approach to network sharing rules deterred investment.
Analysts characterized UNE-P as a negative for both RBOC investors and
the entire telecommunications industry. 53 Analysts further noted that
decreasing investment was rational for RBOCs, and hence positive for
carrier shareholders. One "bright spot" identified by the investment
community during the first quarter of 2003-the height of the UNE-P line
growth boom-was that "practically every telco reported capex well below
our expectations." 54 One firm noted that with SBC's capital expenditure to
revenue ratio at 9%, there was little room for further cuts, while Bell South
and Qwest "still have some room to cut" at 11-12%, respectively, and
Verizon at 15% "is likely best positioned to cut."55 As RBOC capital
spending fell below maintenance levels, financial analysts hoped to see
even deeper cuts. 56 Morgan Stanley wrote that "[a]s the Bells approach
53. PRECURSOR GRP., FCC DECISION ACCELERATES DIS-INvEsTMENT AND SHIFTS
EQUIPMENT DEMAND (Mar. 4, 2003).
How the FCC Decision Depresses Overall Equipment Demand. Precursor believes
the FCC's decision to invigorate/extend UNE-P resale competition will likely
pressure core telecom equipment spending.... (1) Increasing profit pressure
forces Bell capex cuts.... (2) Enables AT&T and WorldCom to cut current capex
to fund UNE-P marketing. Preserving UNE-P for at least four years and making it
available to more of the small business market encourages AT&T and WorldCom
to swap capex for more UNE-P marketing in order to improve cash flow and
profitability short-term. (3) Increases capital investment risk and
uncertainty.... (4) Increases necessity of Bell-LD consolidation, reducing capex
spending. Given that the government is artificially forcing down local profits,
consolidation to achieve cost savings may be the only way to preserve some Bell
shareholder value.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (on file with the Author). "The FCC... increased its anti-investment
bias by favoring resellers over infrastructure owners and equipment suppliers." SCOTT
CLELAND, PRECURSOR GRP., PRECURSOR RETURNING TO NEGATIVE TELECOM OUTLOOK As
FCC INviGoRATEs UNE-P (Feb. 24, 2003) (emphasis omitted) (on file with the Author).
54. MERRILL LYNCH, ILEC SCORECARD 2 (May 15, 2003) (on file with the Author).
55. PRECURSOR GRP.,'TELECOM DISCONNECT': QUALITY OF BELL FREE CASH FLOW
WORSENING (July 21, 2003) (on file with the Author).
56. FUL.CRUM GLOBAL PARTNERS, WIRELINE COMMUNICATIONS: THOUGHTS ON FCC
ORDER (Feb. 25, 2003).
[W]e would not be terribly surprised to see additional cuts from our nation's
largest carriers, as they react to this current FCC order. If these companies are
charged with the fiduciary responsibility of the underlying shareholders, at some
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spending of... mid-teens percentage of sales levels, we do not believe that
we have yet witnessed a bottoming of capex. If conditions worsen and
UNE-P persists, we would expect more capex cuts across the board."
57
Figure 6. Net Capital Stock of Conmmnications Networks
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point it will be more responsible for the companies to begin returning cash flows
to shareholders in the form of large dividends or share buy backs, rather than
deploying capital into the network to generate negative returns for equity and debt
holders.
Id. (on file with the Author).
57. TREND TRACKER, supra note 52.
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The post-Internet financial bust does not explain current trends. The net
capital stock owned by RBOCs was flat in the boom period of the late
1990s, and then declined sharply from those levels. In contrast, other U.S.
communications industries-such as wireless and cable-expanded their
net capital stock at a high rate during the boom, and then reduced
investment growth while maintaining capital infrastructure.
Figure 6 shows the net capital stock for leading pure play firms in
wireless telephony, cable TV, and satellite TV, along with the RBOCs.58
Although the growth of capital stock in these other sectors has flattened, in
contrast to the wireline sector, capital stock is not declining. This is true
despite the fact that these sectors all experienced rapid expansion in the
boom phase of the current cycle, while the BOCs did not.
Similarly, the cable industry did not reduce its capital stock despite
having largely completed a major upgrade of its facilities nationwide. Even
after building out two-way digital infrastructure for the delivery of digital
video and cable modem service, investment remained at historically high
levels. As Figure 7 shows, cable capital expenditures were more than
double RBOCs' in 2002, standardizing on the respective levels of 1996
investment. 59 Similarly, investors spent substantial sums to create satellite
distribution platforms in the 1990s, but then continued to increase net
capital stock post-bubble. (See Figure 7.)
58. These firms are AT&T Wireless and Nextel (wireless telephony), Comcast and
Cablevision (cable TV), and EchoStar (satellite TV). By focusing on pure plays, it is
possible to see the financial picture across different industries. Firms serving multiple
markets typically do not break out capital assets for their component parts, making
aggregate company data less useful in revealing industry trends.
59. While UNE-P deterred telephony upgrades, the cable industry has successfully
opposed "open access" mandates for video and cable modem service, the two markets in
which local cable operators are dominant and which provide the vast majority of industry
revenues. The legal question surrounding regulation of cable modem service was resolved
by the U.S. Supreme Court in National Cable & Telecommunications Assoc. v. Brand X
Internet Services, 345 F.3d 1120 (2005).
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FIGURE 7. NORMALIZED RBOC AND CABLE TV SYSTEM CAPITAL
STOCK (1996=1)
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C. Regulated Resale as a Business Model
Market and financial analysts reached a broad consensus that the resale
opportunities put into place by regulation suppress incumbents' and
competitors' investments in network facilities. The generous profit
opportunity seemingly awarded new competitors disappears in retail
discounts and customer acquisition costs.60 Despite serving more than 4
million subscribers via UNE-P lines, AT&T's entire local residential
business was found essentially worthless in a June 2004 valuation by Legg
Mason. Analysts concluded that "the durability 6of UNE-P remains
relatively immaterial to long-term sector valuations "
The unprofitability of the resale option for entrants undermines the
logic of network sharing rules. These mandates arguably offered
complementary inputs to facilities-based entry, increasing the chance of
financial success. The path chosen by the largest CLECs, AT&T and MCI,
focused almost entirely on resale, a business model that ultimately proved
unremunerative even when wholesale prices were sufficiently low as to
encourage entry. This, combined with an observed crowding out of
facilities-based entry, offers further evidence rejecting the stepping stone
theory.
60. See Hazlett & Havenner, supra note 2, at 442.
61. LEGG MASON, BUSH ADMINISTRATION DECLINES TO BACK FCC APPEAL OF D.C.
CIRcurr's PRO-BELL TRIENNIAL REVIEW RULING (June 9, 2004) (one file with the Author).
See also AT&T, SEC FORM I0-Q 26, 28 (June 30, 2004) (one file with the Author).
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D. Revealed Policy Preferences of Equipment Suppliers
Also informative are the views of telecommunications equipment
manufacturers. Companies such as Intel, Nortel, and Cisco sell key network
components to a wide array of customers. The firms are indifferent to
transfers between telephone companies, but desire healthy economic
conditions that give investors incentives to build networks and upgrade
existing facilities. Manufacturers particularly gain with the construction of
advanced networks, such as those supplying broadband services.
These firms have repeatedly argued that compulsory network sharing
can be dangerous for investment and should be applied lightly if at all. A
good example appears in comments Nortel filed with the FCC in 2002:
Telecom service providers will not invest in infrastructure when
regulatory burdens adversely affect the viability of business cases and
shareholder return on investment. Without such investment, the
equipment suppliers and solutions providers that create innovation will
be unable to sustain their research-and-development efforts. The
present unbundling and pricing rules result in disincentives to
investment on both sides of the issue-for ILECs because they're
required to unbundle and for CLECs because they have much to gain
by waiting for ILECs to construct facilities instead of building their
own.
A Vicious Cycle. Like every other business, carriers need the
freedom to earn a market-based return on their investment.
Unreasonably low, regulated pricing of network elements by definition
prevents a market-based rate of return, inevitably resulting in less
infrastructure investment. This, in turn, leads to less spending with
technology suppliers, which leads to less money available for
technology companies to invest in developing new technology,
resulting in a negative impact on innovation. Productivity and the
overall economy are adversely affected. This is the vicious cycle we
are facing today. This cycle must be interrupted.
62
That the demand for telecommunications equipment is a negative
function of the regulatory sharing mandates is widely shared in the
manufacturing sector. Industry analysts at the Gartner Group analyzed the
impact of November 2004 rules announced by the FCC that will exempt
fiber-to-the-curb deployments built by ILECs or others from unbundling
obligations. This was not only seen as a positive development for RBOCs,
who would own such infrastructure, but for sellers of fiber-optic systems.
The Gartner analysis explicitly forecasts higher sales of advanced fiber
network technology due to the decision not to regulate. (See Figure 8.)
62. Review of Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers, Exparte Comment of Nortel Networks, CC Dkt No. 01-338, (2002) (one file with
the Author).
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Figure 8. Gartner Fiber-Optic Technology Sales Forecast
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V. WIRELESS NETWORKS
A. Fixed-to-Mobile Substitution
Wireless phones are increasingly serving as substitutes for fixed line
telephony, particularly in the residential market. An international
perspective clearly reveals that extensive substitution is possible.
According to one survey of the European Union, 15% of households are
now without any fixed line. This proportion reaches 33% in Finland and
Portugal. 64 Other recent surveys set the Finnish fixed line penetration even
lower. (See Table 1.) The trend toward substitutability is unmistakable.
63. GARTNER GRP., ONE GIGABIT OR BUST ROUNDTABLE (Nov. 15, 2004) (on file with
the Author).
64. The cited statistic excludes recent entrants to the EU, including those in Eastern
Europe. Europa, Information Society, Household Communications in the EU: Mobile
Penetration Catches Up with Fixed Lines, and Broadband Connections Double,
http://europa.eu.int/information-society/newsroom/cf/itemlongdetai.cfm?item-id= 1347
(last visited Apr. 12, 2006).
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Table 1. Fixed to Wireless Substitution in Five EU Countries
Finland Italy Norway Sweden Germany
mobile 91% 97% 85% 97% 83%
penetration
Res Fixed 64 83 86 99 80
Lines per
100
Households
Source: NORTHSTREAM, FIXED-TO-MOBILE SUBSTITUTION IN EUROPE,
(SEPT. 2004), http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:sAAz3w2oF-
EJ:www.incodewireless.comlmedia/whitepapers/2004/Ifrreversiblefixed-
to-mobilesubstitution inEurope.pdf+fixed+to+mobile+substitution+
europe&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=4.
In the United States, substitution is most evident in long-distance
traffic. Wireless users, offered buckets of domestic minutes under digital
one-rate plans-first introduced by AT&T Wireless in May 1998-
increasingly use mobile phones to make their long-distance calls. While
relatively few households have cut the cord, minutes of use are shifting
from fixed to mobile.
This emerging alternative to fixed-line service is obvious and provokes
an examination of federal policies. Regulation to open local markets
pursuant to the 1996 Act has ignored fixed-to-mobile substitution, viewing
wireless as a separate market. This too-narrow approach has led to
difficulties within the telecommunications unbundling regime and to policy
failure in spectrum allocation. The FCC has inadequately permitted mobile
phone networks to develop either voice or broadband services due to
artificial bandwidth constraints applied by government regulation.
B. Spectrum Allocation
The U.S. market does, it should be noted, exhibit a fairly high degree
of competition between mobile carriers, a rivalry that extends to technology
choice. Unlike in many other countries, U.S. regulators have, since 1988,
permitted wireless operators to select their own technical formats. This has
led to the development of three competing systems: Global System for
Mobile Communications ("GSM") used by the Cingular and T-Mobile
networks; Code Division Multiple Access ("CDMA") used by Verizon
Wireless and Sprint-Nextel; and Integrated Digital Enhanced Network
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("iDEN") used by the Nextel network (which was acquired by Sprint, to
form Sprint-Nextel, in 2005).
U.S. policy over the past fifteen years, however, has been relatively
unresponsive in two other crucial dimensions. First, serious lags have been
incurred in issuing licenses to operators. While EU countries received 2G
("second generation") digital cellular licenses 1989-1992, American
licenses were issued beginning in 1995 and, due to confusion over bidding
preferences extended small businesses, the process took a decade to
complete. Long before U.S. 2G licenses were fully distributed, EU
countries had assigned 3G licenses (mostly in 2000 and 2001).65
Fig. 9 Gartner Fiber Optic Technology Sales Forecast
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The result is that U.S. wireless operators utilize only about 190 MHz of
bandwidth, approximately 100 MHz less than countries of comparable
income levels. (See Figure 9.) This regulation-imposed constraint-
abundant underutilized spectrum could be allocated to licenses and sold at
auction to competing bidders 66-costs the U.S. economy substantial sums
65. An FCC auction scheduled to commence June 2006 is the earliest that such licenses
will be awarded in the U.S.
66. Two FCC policy experts have identified 438 MHz of prime spectrum (under 3
GHz) that could be reallocated for flexible use, allowing licensees to provide mobile
telephony, broadband, or other services. See Evan Kwerel & John Williams, A Proposal for
a Rapid Transition to Market Allocation of Spectrum (FCC Office of Plans and Policy,
Working Paper No. 38, 2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attach
match/DOC-228552Al.pdf.
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in lost consumer surplus. More directly relevant to the analysis of local
telephone competition, allocated spectrum would lower per-minute rates
for wireless phone use and expand wireless broadband connectivity. These
networks, already provided by multiple competitors, offer close substitutes
to services provided by ILECs. By misallocating a vital input, regulators
greatly hinder telecommunications policy goals.
Additional spectrum, with rights assigned exclusively and with liberal
usage permitted, is extremely valuable at the margin. Econometric analysis
of wireless markets in twenty-nine countries shows that the relationship
between spectrum allocation and retail prices is strongly negative.
67
Countries with more allocated spectrum enjoyed substantially lower
prices for mobile phone service, and the difference is statistically
significant. Simulations show that the average price per minute of use,
estimated in the model to be about $0.11 in 2003, would fall to about
$0.085 if an additional 80 MHz were allocated and to under $0.06 per
minute were 200 MHz made available. Demand is found to be elastic,
meaning that the minutes of use of mobile telephone service would rise by
a larger percentage increase than the percentage decrease in prices. (See
Table 2.)
These changes would produce huge social benefits on their own: some
$32 billion in additional consumer surplus-the increase in consumer well-
being over and above what the service costs them--is generated per year
with another 80 MHz allocated to wireless telephony. And by reducing
prices for mobile telephony, intermodal competition with fixed-line
networks is stimulated.
67. See THOMAS W. HAZLETr & ROBERTO Mufoz, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR
REGULATORY STUDIES, A WELFARE ANALYSIS OF SPECTRUM ALLOCATION PoiciEs 4-5
(2004), http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id= 1024.
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An Additional Spectrum Allotment of:
80 MHz 140 MHz 200 MHz
Variable Initial Final % A Final % A Final % A
Value Value Value Value
Average 0.112 0.084 -25 0.069 -38.39 0.056 -50
Price/Min.
Min. of 78,340 115,098 46.92 135,763 73.3 153,038 95.35
Use/Month
(mil.)
Consumer Surplus A $31,850 $55,072 $77,419
The value of licenses sold at auction is an additional source of social
gain, but a relatively minor part of the welfare generated by incremental
spectrum allocations. Firms bid for licenses on the basis of expected
profits, which are likely to be at least an order of magnitude less than
consumer surplus. Moreover, the more bandwidth mobile competitors can
use, the less a given license will be worth at auction, precisely because
competitive pressures intensify as additional capacity is available to service
providers.
Additional allocations of licensed, flexible use spectrum also advance
deployment of wireless broadband networks, broadening the cable modem
versus DSL rivalry. Each national wireless network would offer high-speed
Internet access were spectrum more widely available. Indeed, recent
mergers have made this clear. After acquiring AT&T Wireless, Cingular
announced that it would be upgrading its network to provide 400-700 kbps
Univeral Mobile Telecommunications Service ("UMTS") service and
attributed its new strategy directly to the fact that the merger gave it the
bandwidth to offer broadband data in addition to voice and narrowband
data.68 Both Sprint, having acquired Nextel, and Verizon, having acquired
numerous Nextwave licenses, are building national EV-DO networks,
providing 300-700 kbps data service. 69 T-Mobile, left without spectrum
68. Matt Richtel, Cingular to Upgrade Data Network, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2004,
http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FAOEIEFB3A5AOC728CDDAB0994DC40
4482 (requires purchase).
69. Kevin Fitchard, CTA: Sprint building out 3G, lays out revision A plans,
TELEPHONY ONLINE (Mar. 31, 2006), http://telephonyonline.com/home/news/sprint_3g_
revision_033106/.
Table 2. Additional Consumer Surplus in Wireless
Telephony from Additional Spectrum Availability
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rights to acquire, has declared that it has been unable to upgrade its
network to provide broadband service due to its spectrum constraint.7 0 A
recent industry web site summarized T-Mobile's data strategy: "Continue
with EDGE [narrowband data] rollout until enough spectrum is found for
W-CDMA [broadband] technology."
7 1
Not only would spectrum policies that made additional bandwidth
available for the development of broadband networks lead existing cell-
phone carriers to offer expanded service, it would clear a path for
additional entrants. With licenses in the 2.5 GHz band, Clearwire is
attempting to create a nationwide wireless broadband network. Backed by
cellular pioneer Craig McCaw, service is currently provided in
Jacksonville, Florida; Daytona, Florida; St. Cloud, Minnesota; and Abilene,
Texas along with several others, providing wireless Internet access at
maximum download speeds of 768 kbps to 1.5 Mbps. 72 Spectrum
constraints are impeding Clearwire's rollout. The formation of other
platforms is also deterred, including Aloha Networks' 700 MHz service.
73
In countries that have made spectrum more available to the market,
wireless broadband networks are already being built. South Korea has over
12 million EV-DO subscribers, using CDMA wireless phone networks to
transmit audio and video.74 Korea's three CDMA phone networks are
allocated a total of 230 MHz, making it economical to provide both voice
and high-speed data. An additional 100 MHz in the 2.3 GHz to 2.4 GHz
band has been allocated for Wi-Bro, a Korean version of WiMax (wireless
broadband).75
In Australia, where a more liberal spectrum regulatory policy is in
place,76 multiple wireless broadband alternatives compete. Sydney "'has
become the world's leading market showcase for wireless data services,'
70. Dan Meyer, Verizon expands EV-DO, Cingular says it's under no pressure to match
speed, RCR WIRELESS NEWS, July 4, 2005, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1:
133835239/Verizon+expands+EVDO,+Cingular+says+its+under+no+pressure+to+match+s
peed-R-(News).html?refid=SEO (requires purchase).
71. Daily Wireless, The 700 Mhz Club, http://dailywireless.org/modules.php?name=
News&file=article&sid=3714 (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).
72. Clearwire, Service Plans, http://www.clearwire.com/store/service-plans.php (last
visited Apr. 14, 2006).
73. Daily Wireless, supra note 71.
74. IP Inferno, Samsung Wimax Presentation, Oct. 26, 2005, http://ipinferno.blog
spot.com/20051001_ipinferno_archive.html.
75. Mike Clendenin, South Korea Preps Deployment of WiMax Variant, EE TimES
ONLiNE, Jan. 21, 2005, http://www.eetimes.com/news/latest/showArticle.jhtml?articlelDD=
57702772.
76. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Property Rights and Wireless License Values 12 (AEI-
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 04-08, 2004), available
at http://aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=77 1.
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says Robin Simpson, an analyst with U.S. technology research firm Gartner
in Australia .... [A] reason wireless broadband is taking off here: The
government sold off radio spectrum for such services relatively cheaply."
77
Both Unwired Australia and Personal Broadband offer service with the
latter expanding coverage to Melbourne. Using technology from
Arraycomm called iBurst, Personal Broadband offers mobile users 1 Mbps
78
service for $40 per month with desk top usage priced at $28. Arraycomm,
a U.S. company, has attempted for several years to deploy its service in the
United States, but has been unable to obtain the necessary licenses.
C. State Regulation of Cell-Phone Rates
Additional evidence relevant to ongoing policy analysis is gleaned
from the experience with cellular telephone rate controls in the U.S.
Wireless telephone charges were regulated in California, New York,
Arizona, and several other states until federal preemption in August 1994.
During this time, the industry was highly concentrated, with just two firms
operating in each local market, as dictated by federal licensing policy.
Market power was clearly in evidence, and retail prices were substantially
higher than competitive levels despite rate regulation.
79
When federal law was set to eliminate this state-level rate regulation,
many state public utility commissions requested exemptions, arguing that
without regulation consumers would be charged higher prices. The FCC
denied all such requests, and cellular phone rates were deregulated on
August 10, 1994.
During the 1989-1993 period, when states were allowed to regulate
rates, charges declined only slightly. (See Figure 10.) In contrast, with
facilities-based entry8 1 and the consolidation of local and regional systems
into nationwide networks, market forces drove substantial rate reductions.
The magnitude of those attributable to competition relative to what state
regulators were able to achieve8 2 is suggested by projecting the trend for
77. Rebecca Buckman, Unbound Down Under, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2005, at Al,
available at http://www.freepress.net/news/print.php?id=6786.
78. Stephen Withers, iBurst bursts into Melbourne, ZDNET AUSTRALIA, Feb. 22, 2005,
http://www.arraycomm.condocs/20050222ZDNetiBurstburstsintoMelbourne.pdf.
79. See California Public Utilities Commission, Investigation on the Commission's
Own Motion into Mobile Telephone Service and Wireless Communications, Decision 94-08-
022 (Aug. 3, 1994).
80. This uses the earliest price data found, that for 1989.
81. The licensing of personal communications services began in 1995. The award of
two 30 MHz licenses (PCS A and PCS B) was achieved fairly expeditiously, meaning that
two new entrants (per market) were authorized across the U.S. within months of the close of
the A-B auction in March 1995.
82. It is true that a minority of states claimed to fully regulate cellular rates, but all
states had the option of doing so. This allows one to think of the pre-1994 regime as being
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wireless rates through 2002. With federal deregulation, the actual price fell
to $0.12 per minute, while the projected 2002 rate under the most favorable
(i.e., declining) linear pre-deregulation trend, which connects 1992 and
1994, 83 is about $0.33 per minute-175% higher. The deregulated but more
competitive environment dramatically outperforms, underscoring the
importance of public policies that produce facilities-based entry.
FIGURE 10. CELLULAR TELEPHONE RATES, 1989-2002
National Average Price Per Minute of Use
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D. Resellers in an Unregulated Market
A striking development in mobile phone markets is the emergence of
an active wholesale market. The mechanism that was unsuccessfully
imposed by telecommunications regulators attempting to jumpstart
competitive fixed-line networks has been created by the reverse process in
wireless: as competitive networks became established they naturally looked
to expand their business by partnering with resellers.
At least twenty such resellers compete. Some have become substantial:
TracFone serves over 3.5 million customers, 85 and Virgin Mobile USA
one of state regulation. Consistent with this is evidence that states with rate regulation had
rates no lower than unregulated states. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Is Federal Preemption
Efficient in Cellular Phone Regulation?, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 155, 214 (2003), available at
http://www.law.indiana.edu/fclj/pubs/v56/no1/hazlett.pdf.
83. Calibrating the price trend by using the 1989-94 interval produces far larger rate
differentials in 2002. Ending in 1993, the last complete year of state-level rate regulation,
produces an upward slope for the price trend.
84. Estimate A: 2002 cellular rate (price) derived using 1989-94 trend. Estimate B:
Rate derived using 1992-94 trend. See CTIA, WIRELEsS INDusTRY INDIcES, SEMIANNUAL
SURVEY (2005), http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIAYearend2004Survey.pdf.
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over 3 million.86 About twenty million mobile users, ten percent of all
wireless subscribers, will be served by MVNOs in 2006. 87 MVNOs market
retail phone service with actual networks provided by Sprint, Verizon,
Cingular, and various regional carriers.
The MVNO business model has become standardized, creating a
platform hospitable to differentiated products. One industry entrepreneur,
EarthLink founder Sky Dayton, has launched a $440 million venture to
offer state-of-the-art high-speed Internet-connected devices. Aimed at early
adopters of advanced wireless technologies, he is partnering with (Korean
wireless operator) SK and EarthLink, reselling wireless broadband
provided by EV-DO networks under the brand name Helio. As reported by
BusIESs2.0:
Here's the cool part, from an investor's point of view: SK-EarthLink
will try to reach that goal without spending a dime developing its own
infrastructure. Instead, the upstart carrier will rely on Sprint and
Verizon Wireless to provide the backbone for its wireless offerings.
SK-EarthLink will function as a mobile virtual network operator
(MVNO), essentially renting access to each network. It will pay the
carriers a per-minute fee each time one of its customers makes a phone
call or streams a video broadcast. 88
The insurmountable hurdles that appear with forced marriages
evaporate when relationships are forged from mutual advantage. Hence, the
barriers afforded by investments in irreversible capital are replaced by
competitive wholesale pricing, which, in turn, enables innovative retail
competition. The arrival of physical networks streamlined entry into the
wholesale market, not vice versa.
VII. CONCLUSION
The regulatory response to the 1996 Act focused on creating
competitive networks from the inside out. By allowing multiple retail
competitors to share the existing fixed-line phone system in each territory,
regulators hoped to see the emergence of new network build-out over time.
The strategy was ambitious in its legal, political, and economic
requirements, needing delicate balance. Terms for wholesale network
access that were too generous to entrants' sharing facilities would raise the
85. TracFone, About Us, http://www.tracfone.conabout.jsp?task=about&current
View=asurion (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
86. Pieter de Villiers, Virgin Mobile USA Hits 3 Million Subscribers, Wireless World
Forum, Feb, 10, 2005, http://www.w2forum.com/item/virginmobileusahits_3_mn_
subscribers.
87. Stanley Rothman, Sending the Brand into the Wireless World, N.Y. Times, May 3,
2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/03/technologyltechspecial3/03fun.html?ex=
1147838400&en=348370573560336b&ei=5070 (requires subscription).
88. Maier, supra note 27.
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relative cost of new infrastructure investment and deter it; terms that were
insufficiently generous would stimulate little entry.
We have seen marketplace events play out in the decade since passage
of the 1996 Act. The network sharing regime, while encouraging growth in
retail rivalry in the 2000-04 period, did not provide a stepping stone to
facilities-based competition. Instead, the emergence of fast-growing UNE-
P resale crowded out the development of rival infrastructure, leading
investors to withdraw capital from the sector. The dearth of network
investment was seen in the deployments of both incumbent and competitive
local phone carriers.
After eight years of regulatory process, the regime was found to be in
violation of the very law that had inspired it. Moving for the third and
decisive time in March 2004, the federal courts declared that the network
sharing rules devised by the FCC had failed the balancing test required in
the 1996 Act. Unbundled network elements were mandated too widely,
without regard for the disincentives such wholesale access would likely
have in the construction of advanced systems and competitive networks.
This undermined, and violated, the stated goals of the law.
The legal collapse of the network sharing regime has coincided with
independent marketplace developments fortuitously introducing the
competitive structures public policy aimed to achieve. Rivalrous platforms
have arisen to encroach on markets served by incumbent carriers, outside
in. Wireless telephony, with over 175 million American subscribers, is
moving ever closer to fixed-line service in product space with the added
advantage of mobility. Cable TV systems provide a nationwide network
parallel to that provided by local exchange carriers. In the wake of
deregulation, one half of households can subscribe to POTS via the local
cable operator, and virtually any household can use VolP-without a
"phone company"-by subscribing to cable modem service, where
telephony is simply an application riding on broadband networks. Reduced
network sharing obligations encourage deployment of VoIP, eliminating
the business risks that slowed the growth of cable telephony.
Additional pro-competitive policies would assist the emergence of new
networks and the deployment of advanced communications technologies.
Chief among these are more liberal spectrum allocation. U.S. policy has
imposed artificial constraints on the key inputs available to wireless service
providers, raising the cost of mobile voice service, retarding its
competitiveness. These policies also stymie the creation of wireless
broadband networks as are today being deployed in countries with less
restrictive policies. Removing these impediments to network formation
would have been a superior course for policy makers in the years since the
1996 Act outlined a transition path from regulated monopoly to market
competition. Now, with the mandatory network sharing regime proven
[VOL. 58
Number 3] RIVALOUS TELECOM NETWORKS 509
unworkable and, ultimately, illegal, regulators ought to embrace this policy
alternative as if it were their first choice.
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